I am not talking about fixing the result of the game, but rather a sharing of potential future prizemoney.
As an example, I reached the money round at a backgammon tournament this July. The winner was gauranteed to cash, while the loser would get nothing. My opponent and I agreed that the winner would pay the loser’s entry fee. So, at least both of us were gauranteed something.
Question - Are chessplayers allowed to make such arrangements? Can two players (legalyl) agree to a prizemoney split before the game?
Note that easing some of the financial pressure from the big money game in this way might even eliminate some GM draws.
One difference between a Swiss and a knock-out tournament (which is what your backgammon tournament sounded like) is that other prizes may be affected besides just those of the two players.
Even in a tournament that just has overall prizes (say $1000, $500), two players at 4-0 could collude to split $1000 two ways ($500 each) and not worry about the three 3.5-0.5 players behind them. If the top two drew and two of the next three won then there would be $1500 split four ways ($375 each). With a decisive result on the top board, if two of the next three win then they only get $250 each.
If there are class prizes then it can get even more involved.
20L. Manipulating results. Collusion to fix or throw games, whether before or during the game, in order to manipulate prize money, title norms, ratings, or for any other purpose is illegal and may result in severe sanctions, including revocation of USCF membership. Such agreements include arrangements to split prize money no matter what the result of the game. (Emphasis added)
I don’t think I agree with you; they aren’t setting the game in any way, they are just making an agreement that the winner will pay the losers’ entry fee, which won’t effect any crosstables or distribution of prize money as the money will be paid after-the-fact.
Such an agreement means that, due to human nature, the game is more likely to be decisive rather than drawn. That ends up affecting the prize distribution. My example earlier in the thread addressed that one way.
Take the same situation ($1000 for first, $500 for second) with the two 4-0 players playing and this time drawing. If there were only two 3.5-0.5 players and they were paired, then if their game is drawn they get nothing and the other two players get $750 each. If the two 3.5-0.5 players have an agreement for a prize money split then a player that is just able to hold a draw has a monetary incentive to instead let the game go and get back the entry fee (of maybe $100), thus reducing the prize money for the two board one players from $750 each to $500 each.
In the backgammon example cited there are no draws. That is not true in a tournament other than a knock-out tournament. Thus the rule is there to avoid people mistakenly thinking that they are not affecting other players in a Swiss or a round-robin. Although you might be able to make an argument that such an agreement is okay in a knockout tournament, that would unnecessarily complicate the rules and open up chances for making a mistake in how limited the acceptibility of such an agreement may be.
Such an agreeement is against the rules, and if determined then both players are correctly subject to double-forfeiture.
Whatever the rulebook says, I think I would be fine with this in the spirit of the game. The it-is-more-likely-to-produce-a-nondraw argument seems pretty absurd. For the argument to even work that there is danger of collusion to avoid a draw for financial interests, the EF would have to a)force one player to sacrifice rating points, b)have both players risk severe USCF sanctions from throwing-a-game evidence, c) the players have similar ratings (or else why agree beforehand) and d) the potential loser’s Entry Fee be must be of a greater amount than his accepting a draw for some 3-or-more-way split of some prize would be.
But to challenge all of you die-hard naysayers, make it a 5-round swiss with 2 4.0s playing each other and 3rd place has only 3.0 points. There is only one prize - 1st place. Therefore collusion to avoid a draw arguments have absolute zero argument by logical proof. Would you all be ok with this proposed arrangement then?
Again, given the OP’s example, it just seems like two players who don’t want as much riding on the game. I might even speculate that it will help them to play better chess as nerves are less likely to get to them. Whatever, seems like their business and no one is being harmed.
Of course, it’s possible to construct (as you have) a hypothetical example where nobody else is being harmed, but it’s hardly the typical case.
They also have absolute zero benefit to either player, so your example becomes even more moot. It’s like passing a law prohibiting human urine as a food additive – why bother?
It’s still another case of a questionable action being beneficial to precisely the degree to which it is inconsequential.
Of course, the best solution (ho hum, here we go again) is a Plus-Score format, where (at least in the last round) hedging, or even throwing a game or agreeing to a pre-arranged draw, doesn’t affect any other player.
We could trade “derivative” contracts. $100 that Nolan scores at least 3 points. $1000 that he scores at least 2 points in the first 3 rounds. $10,000 that he scores less than 3 points.
